USS Drum (SS-228)

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Third War Patrol

September 23, 1942 - November 8, 1942

Commanding Officer - Lieutenant Commander R.H. Rice

Drum War Patrol Three

Sinkings and Damages - USS Drum (SS-228) War Patrol Three

Date Name
of Vessel
of Vessel
Location Assessment
8 October 1942 Hague Maru Passenger/Cargo 5,641 5,641 34-06N, 136-22E Sunk Sunk
9 October 1942 Hachimanzan Maru Cargo 2,461 2,461 33-27N, 136-01E Sunk Sunk
20 October 1942 Ryunan Maru Cargo 5,106 5,106 34-08N, 136-46E Sunk Sunk
Hague Maru

Image courtesy of History on CD-ROM.

Ryunan Maru

Image courtesy of History on CD-ROM.

Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

Submarine Combat Insignia

1. Narrative
2. Weather
3. Tidal Information
4. Navigational Aids
5. Descriptions of Enemy Vessels Sighted
6. Descriptions of Planes Sighted
7. Particulars of Attack
8. Enemy A/S Measures
9. Major Defects Experienced
10. Radio Reception
11. Sound Conditions and Density Layers
12. Health and Habitability
13. Miles Steamed
14. Fuel Oil Expended
15. Factors of Endurance Remaining
16. Patrol Termination
17. Remarks

(1.) Narrative (All times are INTER unless otherwise labeled)

23 September
0530 (Yoke) Left Midway for assigned areas. The port main shaft began heating up during the afternoon.
1930 (Mike) Crossed the 180th Meridian, changed date to 24 Sept.
24-29 September
Enroute, conducting ship, gun, and fire control drills for training. Stopped port shaft four times during darkness to repack or rearrange packing in stern tube.
1 October
0745 (King) Radar contact, 9 miles. Submerged.
0826 Surfaced.
2 October
Commenced daylight submerged cruising, about 35 miles east of our area and under low broken clouds.
2040 (Inter) Entered area.
3 October
Made landfall in Mikura Shima. The sea made up so that depth control at periscope depth was impossible.
4 October
Sighted a freighter similar to Chokai Maru and began approach, but were unable to close. She appeared to be using a constant helm zig-zag method.
6 October
Shifting operations to Kumano Nada in area.
7 October
When submerged three miles east of Miwazaki Wan, sighted medium sized freighter downbound close inshore. Made approach, but failed to gain good attack position. Sighted a small steamer upbound, too small to shoot.
Just after sunset sighted ship resembling the Kamakura Maru, traveling under diplomatic immunity and due in Yokohama about four days ago. She had a large white cross painted on her stack; and after dusk she was brilliantly lighted with side floodlights and the usual lights of passenger vessels. During this day, sampans, junks, and various small craft were numerous.
8 October
0902 When submerged four miles off Miki Saki Light, sighted smoke, which after some fifteen minutes developed into an air-escorted convoy of four freighters downbound, the first three in close column, the last trailing by about a mile and a half. Commenced approach.
1007 Fired 2 torpedoes at leading ship - both missed (Attack No. 1).
1009 Fired 2 torpedoes at second ship - one hit.
1010 Fired 2 torpedoes at third ship - both missed. Turned to use stern tubes, but found that ship #1 was maneuvering radically; down coast, ships #3 and #4 similarly up coast, while ship #2 was dead in the water, burning, rapidly settling by the stern, and required no more torpedoes to finish her. She was similar to Koyada Maru - 5337 tons. Decided to clear out, bombs having been falling since the firing of our last salvo.
1017 Sighted two bombers, and began running at 80 feet between observations.
1150 Sighted a biplane in a glide toward us.
1210 Resumed periscope patrol. Decided to stand to southward, and gain position east of Shiono Misaki for tomorrow's patrol.
9 October
0155 While closing coast sighted a ship to the eastward, dark of the moon, overcast 100% visibility poor. Maneuvered to identify and ascertain course and speed. After two hours decided that gaining position ahead for submerged attack was impossible in view of approaching daylight, and that night surface attack under visibility conditions existing would probably be a failure, resulting only in the loss of a good position for submerged patrol within our grasp.
0425 Sighted a ship to the southward, which looked very much like a destroyer. Opened to the northeast as dawn broke, and submerged.
0710 Sighted a Tomazuru type torpedo boat range about 7000 yards. Did not attack, since her draft makes the effectiveness of our torpedo unlikely. It is likely that the ship sighted just before dawn was this same torpedo boat.
1031 Sighted a biplane patrolling the coast, and later the smoke of a steamer inshore out of reach. Heavy rain set in.
1625 Heavy rain subsided.
1628 Sighted a freighter, distant 6000 yards and began approach.
1645 Fired 2 torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards (Attack No. 2). First torpedo exploded prematurely about halfway to target. Second torpedo missed. Target turned away and opened fire with her gun. Fired a third torpedo three minutes later which hit with devastating effect. She sank in a minute and a half, her disappearance followed in about 5 seconds by another heavy explosion. She was similar to Lyons Maru (7000 tons).
10-11 October
Heavy seas made periscope patrol impossible.
13 October
1435 While submerged three miles off Katsuura LIght, sighted a Minekaza class destroyer to seaward bound southwest. Began approach, but were unable to get closer than 5000 yards, and she passed out of sight. Turned to close coast again.
1545 Sighted 3 freighters and one passenger-freighter north bound close against the shore, but we were unable to close to good firing position - our reward for having gone to seaward for the DD.
1650 Sighted medium sized freighter (about 5000 tons) downbound and began approach.
1731 Fired 2 torpedoes at a range of 1600 yards (Attack No. 3). The first exploded prematurely about half way to target (30 sec.), and the second missed. Target turned and presented poor opportunity for more shooting, hidden against the hills in failing light.
1738 One bomb, close. A trawler or corvette type patrol craft had been idling about 1000 yards on our off bow during this approach.
1746 He passed over our stern and dropped two close depth charges. Began evasive tactics. A four hour sound search ensued, in which apparently supersonic and sonic equipped vessels participated. There were as many as seven within hearing, at one time, and on two occasions ships passed directly over us without realizing that they had done so.
2240 Last sound contact.
2300 Surfaced.
16-18 October
Position doubtful. Heavy rains, heavy seas, visibility poor. Finally determined position 1630 the 18th.
19 October
Submerged eight miles east of Kantori Saki, sighted six freighters, three trawlers, and dozens of small craft passing up and down the coast, but we were too far out to close any suitable targets. Finally, at noon, we gained the position for which we had been striving - a pocket where deep water runs in close to the shore - only to find ourselves literally fenced off by a line of spar buoys carrying bright red and white flags. Considering the likelihood of fouling a fish net and finding ourselves towing a bright red flag away from an irate fisherman, stood clear.
20 October
Worked up the coast during the night and submerged southwest of Daio Saki. The entire day was spent in the presence of patrolling trawlers, three of which passed over us.
1545 Sighted smoke to northeast, which developed into a three ship convoy with air escort. These ships were in a loose wedge-like formation. Began approach.
1619 Fired 2 stern tubes at leading ship, and 2 at second ship (Attack No. 4). First ship was hit dead amidships by the first torpedo, and careened violently to port until her bridge wing was almost awash. She then righted herself and began settling rapidly. The second ship turned just after we fired, and both torpedoes missed ahead.
1620 Bombs from the escort had begun to fall.
1625 Continued observation of sinking ship until sight of a bomb landing fairly close in our wake counselled going deep. The ship hit was similar to the London Maru (7200 tons), and it was loaded. When last seen she had settled with a good half of her main deck awash, and undoubtedly she sank.
1645 One depth charge fairly close. Began running silent. Sound search consisted of one supersonic ship and one other. The counter attack was weak, consisting only of two fairly close charges and three distant ones.
22 October
While submerged four miles south of Shiono Misaki sighted a Tomozuru class torpedo boat engaged in a supersonic search. After about an hour she disappeared to the westward. From 0900 to 1700 today we were so situated that no ship could have rounded Shiono Misaki in either direction without our seeing it. Still nothing was sighted but one torpedo boat!
2140 On the surface in bright moonlight patrolling into the moon at slow speed to close Shiono Misaki, before daybreak, sighted a submarine lying to to the southward about 2500 yards distant. We were at this time 3.5 miles south of our area limit and it appeared likely that this was a friendly submarine on the retiring line of area. Stood to the northward to avoid. Two hours later we had indications of another radar in the vicinity.
23 October
Submerged patrol close inshore off Miki Saki. Light surface haze made periscope visibility very poor. Small gunboat, small freighter, two trawlers, numerous small craft. The entire day was spent in what should have been excellent hunting ground, but there was no traffic of any importance.
24 October
Position doubtful. Sighted two medium sized freighters, unable to close.
25 October
Dived ten miles from Daio Saki Light.
0545 On coming to periscope depth before sunrise sighted medium sized freighter, range about 5000 yards, angle on the bow 90°, and passing out of range to northeast.
0610 Another medium sized ship north bound but close inshore and out of range.
0700 Two trawler type patrol craft flying the naval ensign made a sweep toward us and turned southwest.
0859 Sighted a medium sized freighter upbound close inshore, and started approach.
0940 Fired 2 torpedoes at range of 1250 yards, both of which passed under target without exploding (Attack No. 5).
0942 Fired 2 more torpedoes. Forty-nine seconds after firing, the first of these exploded close to and in line with the target's stack, and threw up a large geyser of water from which small bright bits of metal flew. The explosion was less severe than that of a normal war head; and the target turned away, apparently undamaged, maneuvering radically.
0950 Set course to clear immediate vicinity.
1115 Nine very distant depth charges.
27 October
1235 While submerged two miles off shore between Nojima Saki and Katsuura sighted three freighters southbound in company but not in formation zig-zagging independently. Decided to attack first and largest freighter, similar to Koryu Maru (6700 tons).
1325 Fired 2 torpedoes, both missed (Attack No. 6).
1326 Fired 2 more torpedoes and went to 90 feet in a hurry to avoid collision with #2 freighter which was very close aboard, angle on bow zero.
1327 Heard explosion of fourth torpedo.
1939 Came to periscope depth. The target had closed the beach somewhat, was dead in the water, listed well to port, settling by the stern, well on the way to sinking. (The other freighters had taken shelter in Kamogawa Wan). There were a white junk and three small fishing boats within 100 yards of us at this time, which may explain lack of aircraft bombs. Set course to clear vicinity.
1812 Surfaced. Observed searchlights and other unusual lights on shore in the vicinity of our attack. Set course to clear area and return to base.
28 October
Cleared area.
30-31 October
High winds and very heavy seas forced reduction of speed. Made good about 5.5 knots.
2 November
(LOVE) Made dive for trim and went to test depth to observe tightness of maneuvering room hard patch.
3 November
1124 (Mike) Received orders from CTF-7 concerning Japanese sampan 800 miles to the westward. Notified 7.1.10 as directed.
1719 (Mike) Received orders from CTF-7 to proceed to Pearl.
4 November
Crossed International Date Line and changed date to November 3rd.
4 November
2353 (Yoke) Received rendezvous instructions from CTF-7.
6 November
1050 (X) Sighted TRIGGER to the southward.
7 November
0845 (X) Sighted TRIGGER and exchanged recognition signals.
8 November
Effected rendezvous with LITCHFIELD and TRIGGER and entered Pearl.

(2.) Weather

Weather enroute to station and while in the area was generally excellent. On the return trip the seas were generally rough and on two days, October 30 and 31, the heavy seas cut speed to 6 knots for about 40 hours. Three days were lost on station because of seas too heavy in which to conduct a periscope patrol, and two days were lost due to poor visibility. Visibility along the coast between Miki Saki and Shiono Misaki was usually hampered by a hazy atmosphere. Winds were generally NW or NE, average force 3.

(3.) Tidal Information

Currents encountered were generally as indicated in the Asiatic Pilot and on charts. As stated in the Asiatic Pilot local winds influence the direction of flow of the Kuroshio and when easterly winds predominated a strong westerly set was experienced.

(4.) Navigational Aids

Navigational lights observed as follows:

(a) Shiono Misaki - not sighted from less than 10 miles distant on the surface.

(b) Kashino Saki - normal

(c) Kantori Saki - normal

(d) Miki Saki - normal

(e) Ko Shima - normal

(f) Daio Saki - one white flash every 25 seconds.

(g) Nojima Saki - not sighted from seven miles distant on the surface. The lighthouse has apparently been rebuilt since the Drum's first patrol in this area in May 1942. At that time Nojima Saki lighthouse was a green-brown, squatty tower and now is a tall, white lighthouse.

The SD radar was invaluable in navigating at night. The high grade sextant was used to fix the night position with good results.

(5.) Descriptions of Enemy Vessels Sighted

Contact No. Time Type Position Course Speed Description
1. 1145 (K)
Oct. 2
Trawler 34-40 N., 141-31 E. 035°(T) 6 knots Two masted
2. 0535 (I)
Oct. 4
Freighter 33-48 N., 139-23 E. 130°(T) 9 knots 3000 tons, KFK, Similar to Chokai Maru
3. 1317 (I)
Oct. 4
Patrol Boat 33-44 N., 139-23 E. 030°(T) - Small yacht type
4. 1255 (I)
Oct. 7
Freighter 33-45 N., 136-03.5 E. 195°(T) 9 knots Straight bow, MFM well deck 3000 ton
5. 1425 (I)
Oct. 7
Steamer 33-38 N., 136-02 E. 020°(T) - Small inter-island steamer MFM
6. 1730 (I)
Oct. 7
Liner 33-39 N., 136-05 E. 040°(T) - Kamakura Maru 18000 tons - diplomatic ship
7. 0840 (I)
Oct. 8
Tuna Boat 33-59 N., 136-19 E. 040°(T) 12 knots -
8. 0902 (I)
Oct. 8
4 Freighter convoy 34-06 N., 136-22 E. 225°(T) 8.5 knots Each freighter about 5000 tons - MFM - Attack No. 1
9. 0155 (I)
Oct. 9
Unknown - night 33-26.5 N., 136-09 E. 250°(T) 10 knots Night sighting
10. 0425 (I)
Oct. 9
Torpedo Boat 33-25 N., 136-02 E. 270°(T) - Night sighting - ship appeared similar to Tomozuru class T.B.
11. 0710 (I)
Oct. 9
Torpedo Boat 33-27 N., 136-08 E. 225°(T) - Single stack, tripod foremast similar to Tomozuru class T.B.
12. 1118 (I)
Oct. 9
Masts only 33-32 N., 136-02 E. 225°(T) - -
13. 1628 (I)
Oct. 9
Freighter 33-27 N., 136-01 E. 065°(T) 8.5 knots 5-6000 tons MFM Attack No. 2
14. 1310 (I)
oct. 13
Freighter 35-00 N., 140-25 E. 040°(T) - Masts and stack only
15. 1500 (I)
Oct 13.
Destroyer 35-04 N., 140-24 E. West - Minekaze class DD
16. 1545 (I)
Oct. 13
2 Freighters, 1 Passenger Cargo 35-07 N., 140-23 E. 055°(T) 9 knots MFM - 5000 tons
17. 1650 (I)
Oct. 13
Freighter 35-06 N., 140-23 E. 245°(T) 9 knots 5000 tons - MFM - Attack No. 3
18. 1515 (I)
Oct. 16
Freighter 34-15 N., 136-58 E. 265°(T) 8 knots MFM - 5000 tons
19. 0630-1000 (I)
Oct. 19
6 Freighters, 3 Trawlers 33-34 N., 135-58.5 E. 035°(T), 215°(T) - Medium size close inshore
20. 1545 (I)
Oct. 20
3 Freighters convoy 34-08 N., 136-46.5 E. 240°(T) 7 knots 2 ships similar to London Maru 7200 tons - 1 ship 4000 tons. MFM. Attack No. 4
21. 1245 (I)
Oct. 22
Torpedo Boat 33-21 N., 135-46 E. 090°(T) - Similar to Tomozuru class torpedo boat. Apparently patrolling Shiono Misaki area.
22. 2230 (I)
Oct. 23
Submarine 33-11.5 N., 136-14 E. - - Night sighting
23. 1128 (I)
Oct. 23
Freighter 33-49 N., 136-07 E. 225°(T) - 3000 tons, MFM
24. 1245 (I)
Oct. 23
Patrol Gunboat 33-50 N., 136-10 E. 225°(T) 9 knots Small gunboat - MFM
25. 1732 (I)
Oct. 23
Freighter 33-52.5 N., 136-12 E. 045°(T) - Medium size - seen in failing light
26. 1420 (I)
Oct. 24
2 Freighters Vicinity Daio Saki 220°(T) 7 knots MFM - 5000 tons each
27. 0545 (I)
Oct. 25
Freighter 34-10 N., 136-59 E. 030°(T) 7 knots MFM - 4000 tons
28. 0610 (I)
Oct. 25
Freighter 34-10 N., 136-59 E. 030°(T) - MFM - medium size
29. 0859 (I)
Oct. 25
Freighter 34-16 N., 136-58 E. 050°(T) 6.5 knots MFM - 5000 tons Attack No. 5
30. 1235 (I)
Oct. 27
Freighter 35-05 N., 140-11.5 E. 225°(T) 10 knots KFK - Similar to Koryu Maru - 6700 tons Attack No. 6

(6.) Descriptions of Planes Sighted

Contact No. Time Type Position Course Altitude
1. 0745 (K)
Oct. 1
Radar contact 34-59.5 N., 146-15 E. - -
2. 0902 (I)
Oct. 8
Unknown 34-60 N., 136-22 E. 040°(T) Low
3. 1017 (I)
Oct. 8
3 bombing planes 34-06 N., 136-22 E. - Low. Convoy escort
4. 1031 (I)
Oct. 9
Biplane 33-27 N., 136-10 E. 220°(T) Low
5. 1700 (I)
Oct. 18
Patrol Plane 33-27 N., 135-45 E. North Low
6. 0650 (I)
Oct. 19
2 Patrol Planes 33-34 N., 135-58 E. South Low
7. 1600 (I)
Oct. 20
Unknown 34-10 N., 136-41 E. 240° Low. Convoy escort
8. 1210 (I)
Oct. 22
Biplane 33-23 N., 136-45 E. 240° Low
9. 1520 (I)
Oct. 24
34-13 N., 136-58 E. - Low  
10. 1701 (I)
Oct. 27
Biplane 34-54 N., 140-20 E. North Low

(7.) Particulars of Attack

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Est. Speed Track Angle Torpedo Performance
1 (a) 2 7 sec. 1000 yds. MOT 14 ft. 10 ft. 8.5 knots 104°P 105°P Probably passed under target without exploding
1 (b) 2 7 sec. 1200 yds. MOT 20 ft. 10 ft. 8.5 knots 90°P 90°P 1 hit, 1 miss (normal)
1 (c) 2 7 sec. 1400 yds. MOT 20 ft. 10 ft. 8.5 knots 130°P 129°P 2 misses (normal)

1(a) This was the first of three almost simultaneous attacks. Visual observation of torpedo runs was impracticable because I was busy setting up to fire at two more targets. Sound tracked both torpedoes to the target. The approach had been deliberate and long, and there is no room for doubt that the target course used was absolutely correct, and that the estimated speed was very nearly so. The same fire control data used on the second ship (1(b)) produced a hit 100 feet abaft MOT. Considering offset angles used on these two firings, attack 1(a) should have produced one hit 70 feet forward of MOT and one 20 feet forward of MOT. I am convinced that both these torpedoes passed under the target.

1(b) This ship was hit abaft her stack. She immediately listed to port, began to settle by the stern, afire aft, and undoubtedly sank. She was similar to Koyada Maru (5337 tons).

1(c) This ship had become alarmed before we were able to shoot at her, and succeeded in turning to avoid torpedoes.

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Est. Speed Track Angle Torpedo Performance
2 3 7 sec. 3 min. 1200 yds. 2200 yds. MOT 20 ft. 10 ft. 8.5 knots 107°S 106°S 180° #1 Premature, #2 ?, #3 Splendid!

The original attack consisted of two torpedoes. A violent explosion occurred 32 seconds after firing the first. This explosion completely obscured the target for about ten seconds; but when the geyser subsided, the target was turning away and shooting her gun. The premature explosion of #1 torpedo probably affected the run of #2, following seven seconds behind. A third torpedo fired at a range of 2200 yards on a 180° track hit with devastating effect. She was literally spun around to port, and sank within 90 seconds, her disappearance followed by another violent explosion. She was similar to Lyons Maru (7000 tons).

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Est. Speed Track Angle Torpedo Performance
3 2 7 sec. 1600 yds. MOT 18 ft. 10 ft. 9 knots 136°P 137°P #1 Premature, #2 ?

The first torpedo exploded prematurely 30 seconds after firing. The second, 7 seconds behind the first, missed. The target maneuvered after explosion, and another calculated attack was impossible due to failing visibility and background conditions.

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Est. Speed Track Angle Torpedo Performance
4 (a) 2 7 sec. 1400 yds. MOT 20 ft. 10 ft. 7 knots 81°P 82°P #1 hit at MOT, #2 missed
4 (b) 2 7 sec. 1500 yds MOT 18 ft. 10 ft. 7 knots 75°P 77°P Both missed (target avoided)

4(a) First ship was hit dead amidships by first torpedo and began settling rapidly. When last seen her weather deck was well awash, and she undoubtedly sank. She was similar to London Maru (7200 tons).

4(b) This attack was made on the second ship just before she started to maneuver to let both torpedoes pass ahead.

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Est. Speed Track Angle Torpedo Performance
5 4 7 sec. 65 sec. 85 sec. 1250 yds. MOT 18 ft. 10 ft. 6.5 knots 92°S 94°S 102°S 110°S 2 exploder failures, 1 inexplicable explosion, 1 miss

This attack was delivered from perfect position on a target which had been allowed to "come on" for fifteen minutes. No approach ever has been made more deliberately, nor checked along more exactly. We literally sat, dead in the water (with an occasional kick at 1/3 speed to ensure depth control) - and clocked the angle on the bow frequently from 10° to 90°. The estimated course was exact; the estimated speed almost as certainly correct. So sure was I of this attack that I almost fired only one torpedo. I watched the smoke of the first two torpedoes pass under the mainmast and close under the stern respectively, which should have produced hits at points just forward of the MOT and just abaft of the MOT. Neither exploded. Forty-nine seconds after being fired, the third torpedo produced an explosion in line with MOT, and a geyser of water and light smoke which disappeared in a few seconds. Small bright bits of metal flashed out of this explosion - and the explosion was markedly weaker than any war head we have heard. The only explanation which comes to mind is that it was an air flask explosion. At any rate the target turned, apparently quite unharmed, and maneuvered radically. Fourth torpedo missed.

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Est. Speed Track Angle Torpedo Performance
6 4 7 sec. 63 sec. 75 sec. 1050 yds. to 1400 yds. MOT 20 ft. 10 ft. 9.5 knots 105°P 109°P 125°P 140°P Normal

This approach was made in the presence of numerous small craft, some very close aboard, so that periscope exposures were short. Position attained was considered very good, and fire control data good. Torpedoes were fired almost under the forefoot of another steamer, and we had to go deep just after firing. The fourth torpedo hit. When last seen, the target was dead in the water, listed well to port, and had settled by the stern. It is considered almost certain that she sank. She was similar to the Koryu Maru (6700 tons).

(8.) Enemy A/S Measures

Nothing new. Anti-submarine activity was notably less vigorous and less effective than that encountered here five months ago.

(9.) Major Defects Experienced

Material performance was excellent throughout, evidence of a fine job of overhaul by the FULTON at Midway.

"A" Engineering

Port stern tube and shaft - The port stern tube stuffing box leaked excessively during the last patrol and could not be stopped. During the refit period, September 2-23, examination by the U.S.S. FULTON repair unit revealed the following: (a) the shaft at the stern tube had an eccentricity of .007" (b) the coupling studs had been incorrectly assembled causing a whip or misalignment between the driving and driven couplings. The FULTON reduced the eccentricity, manufactured body bound bolts which were installed in the coupling, and packed the shaft with 5 rings of flax packing. Enroute to the area the stern tube bearing gland and shaft ran hot. This was caused by the stoppage of all cooling water leaking past the packing rings. The shaft was repacked 4 times in 5 days at sea and each time the #5 or outboard ring showed definite indications of turning. This turning may be attributed to grooves in the shaft caused by previous lead packing and eccentricity of the shaft with the gland. The final packing consisted of #5 ring lead packing, the other 4 rings flax packing. After being run in for a considerable period the port shaft and stern tube bearing settled down and at present there is a appreciable difference in temperature between the port and starboard shafts. It is considered that the port shaft is satisfactory now, and no special repair work is recommended. However, at the next dry docking of the Drum the port shaft and stern tube bearing should be aligned, and the grooves in the shaft removed.

"B" Radio, Sound, and Radar

During the first depth charge attack the radio antenna trunk flooded. This same defect was experienced last patrol, and the leakage was found to be due to a damaged insulator.

(10.) Radio Reception

Radio reception was complete at all times.

Last Consecutive Serial Sent - 041835

Last Consecutive Serial Received - 060559

(11.) Sound Conditions and Density Layers

Sound conditions along the southeastern coast of Japan were poor.

There were no definite density layers observed.

(12.) Health and Habitability

The health of the crew, except for a few colds, was excellent. The habitability was excellent also. During submerged operations the following meal hours were observed:

0330 - 0430 Breakfast
1130 Dinner
1730 Supper

The food was very good and well prepared.

(13.) Miles steamed enroute to station 2290 (Nav). Miles steamed enroute from station 3580 (Nav).

(14.) Fuel oil expended - 75,000 gallons.

(15.) Factors of Endurance Remaining

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions (days) Fresh Water Personnel (days)
1 18,000 gallons 30 Unlimited 14

(16.) This patrol was brought to an end by the virtual expenditure of torpedoes.

(17.) Remarks - miscellaneous


Four days of this patrol were spent off Mikura Shima in the hope that there we might encounter men-of-war bound between Yokosuka and the Solomons. Other submarines enroute have seen important ships in this locality. Our time there produced only one sighting - a small freighter.


On previous patrols it had been impossible to keep paint on the periscopes. Prior to this cruise, the FULTON etched the periscopes, and the paint adhered perfectly.


Recapitulation of torpedoes fired:

Attack No.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Hits 1 1   1   1
Misses (TDC)           2
Misses (target maneuvered) 2     2 1  
Misses (which should have hit in view of other hits with same firing data) 3     1   1
Premature explosions   1 1      
Misses (probably due to prematures ahead of them)   1 1      
Peculiar explosion (air flask?)         1  
Duds (known to have passed under)         2  
TOTALS 6 3 2 4 4 4 = 23

Thus, of 23 torpedoes fired, 5 were certainly of no service to us, and 4 more were almost certainly of no service.

No one likes to blame his tools. I cannot but feel that we accomplished only half of what we earned, and even a smaller fraction of what we were capable of doing with good exploder performance. Not one of the attacks was hasty: not one was fired from extreme range or from a poor initial position. There was no "seaman's eye" background for shooting. Many long range, doubtful opportunities were passed up, in the sure knowledge that with the time available to us in the areas we should be able to use all torpedoes on good, calculated attacks. Developments during attacks #2, #5, and #6 resulted in the expenditure of more torpedoes than should have been used. But even with the firings as they stand, we should have accounted for seven ships instead of four.

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