USS Drum (SS-228)

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Fourth War Patrol

November 29, 1942 - January 24, 1943

Commanding Officer - Lieutenant Commander B.F. McMahon

Drum War Patrol Four

Sinkings and Damages - USS Drum (SS-228) War Patrol Four

Date Name
of Vessel
of Vessel
Location Assessment
12 December 1942 Ryuho Light Aircraft Carrier - 13,360 32-04N, 142-30E - Damage Confirmed

Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

Submarine Combat Insignia

1. Narrative
2. Weather
3. Tidal Information
4. Navigational Aids
5. Description of All Ships Sighted
6. Description of All Planes Sighted
7. Particulars of Attack
8. Enemy A/S Measures
9. Major Defects Experienced
10. Radio Reception
11. Sound Conditions and Density Layers
12. Health and Habitability
13. Miles Steamed
14. Fuel Oil Expended
15. Factors of Endurance Remaining
16. Patrol Termination
17. Remarks


Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. on November 8, 1942 from Third War Patrol. Commenced refit on November 9, 1942 by Submarine Base personnel. On November 14, 1942, Lieut. Comdr. R.H. Rice, U.S. Navy was relieved as Commanding Officer by Lieut. Comdr. B.F. McMahon, U.S. Navy. Completed refit on November 23, 1942. SJ radar installed. Commenced training period on November 24, 1942. Completed on November 26, 1942. Readiness for sea date, November 29, 1942. Not depermed nor wiped.

(1.) Narrative

29 November
Left Pearl Harbor for area ----, via Midway, under escort of U.S.S. BERYL.
1830 (W) Parted company with escort. Conducted ship drills and training dives enroute.
3 December
1245 (Y) Arrived Midway. Took on fuel and lube oil; topped off fresh and battery water and fresh provisions. Made repairs to SJ radar.
1650 (Y) Departed Midway with sub chaser escort.
12 December
0910 (K) Made SD radar contact on plane 16 miles distant. Submerged.
0945 (K) Surfaced. Instructed lookouts to be particularly alert on the assumption that plane may have been scouting ahead of some surface unit.
1010 (K) Attack No. 1. Position: Lat. 32-04 N., Long. 142-30.0 E. Lookout reported smoke on horizon, bearing 330°(T). Turned to course 330°(T) to close to investigate.
1020 (K) Ship appears to be a warship under escort of one DD. We don't dare hope so, but it looks suspiciously like a flat top, on southerly course, starboard angle.
1025 (K) Submerged to escape detection. Came to normal approach course and commenced approach.
1030 (K) Lost power on the port screw, but regained it after a few minutes.
1040 (K) The ship is now definitely determined to be a carrier, with a full deck load of planes, escorted by one destroyer, patrolling about 1000 yards ahead on the starboard bow. We wish we had all our tubes forward loaded with torpedoes.
1110 (K) Having allowed the escort to pass ahead of us, we closed the track at high speed and at 1200 yards torpedo run, fired 4 torpedoes. Swung ship to left immediately, to bring the stern tubes on. We have taken in a lot of water forward through the poppets and the boat is getting heavy. Forty seconds after firing, heard one (1) sharp explosion. Several seconds later heard a long reverberating explosion. Raised the periscope. The carrier is listing to starboard, and down by the bow. There is a large smoke cloud at the break of her flight deck forward. The ship was so listed that the entire top of the flight deck was visible to the Commanding Officer. At this point she was firing her guns at the periscope. A large wake over to the right shows the DD is heading our way. Sound reports screws too fast to count.
1112 (K) With the stern tubes coming on now, raised periscope for final bearing. We are losing depth control, the target is barely visible over the wave tops. At this point the first bearing was incorrectly transmitted to the TDC. When the corrected bearing was introduced, the Commanding Officer could no longer see the target. Did not attempt to fire the stern tubes, as the destroyer was now close aboard. Ordered 200 feet.
1118 (K) Port screw again out of commission. Running two thirds on starboard.
1121 (K) A string of 9 depth charges, all close and shook the boat considerably, but no damage. Destroyer retired for second attack.
1135 (K) Destroyer passed directly overhead. Screws were heard plainly throughout the ship. A string of 7 depth charges, each one coming progressively closer. All of these were closer than the first salvo. No damage. At this point the boat had got very heavy, and reached a depth of 350 feet, before it was stopped by putting a bubble in safety; a very undesirable condition, but there was no alternative. Having the port shaft out adds to our difficulties.
1150 (K) Destroyer passed directly overhead again, but apparently he had lost contact, and dropped no depth charges. He withdrew in the direction of the carrier and was no longer heard.
1300 (K) Port shaft is back in commission.
1445 (K) Surfaced and proceeded to investigate scene of attack.
1510 (K) Sighted a very large gasoline slick about a mile wide and extending in a direction about 140°(T). Proceeded on this course to investigate thoroughly.
1540 (K) Radar reported a plane contact. Submerged and thus ended our investigation. Went to 150 feet and commenced permanent repairs to port shaft.
2000 (K) Attempted to get contact report through to NPM, but was unsuccessful. A great deal of Japanese transmission and interference was noted. After trying for four (4) hours sent the message through blind twice. We have now completed repairs to the port shaft interlocks and hope we experience no more trouble with this.
13 December
0700 (K) Submerged.
0730 (K) Heard two (2) distant explosions.
0905 (K) Heard three (3) distant explosions. We are very near the vicinity of yesterday's attack. We make some wild guesses at the meaning of these explosions. Perhaps the Japs are putting the finishing touches (of necessity) to our handiwork of yesterday.
We decided to remain submerged today for the following reasons: (1) Service torpedoes. (2) Determine cause and extent of trouble in port main shaft control interlock. (3) Make repairs to the drain pump.
1810 (K) All of the above accomplished. Surfaced.
14 December
0700 (K) Submerged. Decided to remain submerged during the daylight henceforth until we reach our area and have completed our mine laying; in order to insure our undetected entrance into Bungo Suido.
16 December
Entered operating area.
1915 (K) Surfaced. Proceeding towards area assigned for mine plant.
2120 (K) Made SJ radar and sight contact on enemy destroyer simultaneously. At this instant enemy turned on search light, which swept directly astern of us.
2123 (K) Submerged. Tracked enemy by sound. Went to 200 feet.
2130 (K) Destroyer dropped 6 depth charges close, and commenced a supersonic search. We employed evasive tactics.
2300 (K) Lost all contact with DD.
17 December
0145 (K) Surfaced. Proceeded to assigned mine plant area.
1430 (K) Arrived in assigned area and commenced mine plant.
1645 (K) Completed mine plant and set course to clear to southward. Excellent work by the torpedo room personnel. We have planted our mines in the vicinity of a gas buoy in Lat. 32-49.0 N., Long. 132-13.0 E., which is obviously a mid-channel marker.
18 December
Commenced patrol of approaches to Bungo Suido on the 160°-340° line, which so well served the TRIGGER. Very bright moonlight nights.
20 December
2315 (K) Made sight contact on true bearing 255°. Submerged because of bright moonlight. Searched carefully with periscope and SJ radar at 40 feet, found nothing.
2335 (K) Surfaced and proceeded to investigate in direction of true bearing.
2340 (K) Sighted destroyer patrolling in moonlight. Went to full speed to avoid. Destroyer has seen us and is trailing astern. The range is 10,000 yards and closing rapidly. This is not very comfortable. He stays right on our tail. We are on southerly course and tracking with the SJ radar.
21 December
The destroyer is still with us and now too close for comfort.
0100 (K) Submerged. Enemy commenced supersonic search on 19 KCS.
0235 (K) Lost contact.
0413 (K) Heard screws and echo ranging of two A/S vessels.
0600 (K) Lost all contact.
2000 (K) Surfaced.
2315 (K) Sighted patrol boat at about 5000 yards. He is blinking a recognition signal at us. We blink back at him with the signal gun, and he turns away. However, he can't find this one in his signal book, so he is back again, blinking. We return the compliment, trying to imitate a Japanese signalman striker. He is satisfied finally and goes on his way and we on ours. All these patrol boat contacts have resulted in forcing us out of our assigned area.
24 December
We have a despatch from CTF-7 which we cannot understand and another which it is impossible to decode. Since we are outside our area, it is decided to transmit a request for clarification. Also transmitting a report on attack of 12 December.
25 December
We receive a message from CTF-7 cancelling the despatch we could not understand. It was improperly addressed to us.
26 December
0015 (K) Made SJ radar and sight contact on patrol boat. Took course to avoid.
0113 (K) Made SJ radar contact at 14,000 yards. Sighted large ship, hull down, in bright moonlight. Radar and plot indicate target zig-zagging on course 320°(T), speed above 25 knots.
0130 (K) Submerged to avoid detection, and continued tracking with SJ radar at 40 feet. Closest range 9000 yards. Target pulling away rapidly.
0230 (K) Abandoned approach and surfaced. Received acknowledgement of our contact report from CTF-7, also received a message in a system we cannot decode. Decided to remain outside the area for another transmission.
27 December
Received clarifying message from CTF-7. We have had to remain outside our area for three (3) nights in the process of getting this communication matter cleared up.
29 December
0130 (K) Made SJ radar contact over 15,000 yards. Commenced tracking. Target is two ships on course 45°(T), speed 15 knots and we are abaft of the beam, about 160 track. Bright moonlight and heavy seas.
0215 (K) Because of small speed differential, bright moonlight and heavy seas we do not believe we have a good opportunity of closing him. Furthermore, we will be well into area ---- by time we reach him, if we do. We abandon pursuit. Sighted several patrol boats during the day off Ashizuri Zaki.
31 December
0725 (K) Sound reported screws on starboard beam. In semi-darkness sighted a ship through the periscope. It is a destroyer at about 4000 yards range, on parallel course, angle on the bow 90° port, making 15 knots. Unfortunately we are not in position to attack.
2245 (K) Made SJ radar contact at 7000 yards. It is either a destroyer or sub chaser. Took course and speed to avoid.
1 January
0100 (K) Made SJ radar contact at 8000 yards. It is the same craft we saw last night. Maneuvered to avoid.
2 January
Having no luck in steamer lanes, decided to try the hunting inshore. Spent the day off Tosaki Hana. Nothing sighted.
2000 (K) In searching with SJ radar, just prior to surfacing, made contact on two (2) small targets close together, range 7000 yards and opened rapidly to 9000 yard and lost contact.
2020 (K) Surfaced.
5 January
2000 (K) Surfaced and commenced a surface patrol of approaches to Bungo Suido. Dark night with overcast and rain squalls.
2245 (K) Attack No. 2. Lat. 32-09.0 N., Long. 132-10.0 E. SJ radar reported a contact on bearing 045°(T), range 15,000 yards. Stopped and commenced tracking.
2250 (K) Commenced approach, closing the track at full speed.
2300 (K) Radar reports this is a large ship with another small ship escorting her. Plot reports course 160°(T), speed 12 knots.
2313 (K) Radar reports another small ship escort. There are three (3) ships in this group, the escorts patrolling ahead and on either side. No sight contact yet.
2316 (K) Target is now in sight, but very indistinct. The starboard screen is a destroyer and is now very close. Port screen not visible. Decided to attack astern of the near escort.
2317 (K) Starboard screen passed ahead of us at about 1000 yards. We are fortunate in having a low clouded background and are not seen, although for a moment it was nip and tuck. The range to the destroyer is now opening. The Commaning Officer concentrating on the target ship, now indistinctly makes her out to be a long low hull with a low island superstructure amidships, probably a large tanker. The quartermaster has been told to watch the destroyer, which he does with evident concentration. We are closing the track at full speed. Radar and plot have established course and speed at 160°(T), 12 knots. We are sure of our data.
2320 (K) Range to target 2000 yards, about 1500 yards astern of starboard escort. Fired 3 torpedoes. Knowing that our presence will soon be discovered, we turned sharply to the left and submerged.
About a minute and a half after firing, torpedo room reported one (1) explosion. This is not heard by the control party.
2322 (K) At periscope depth, a heavy attenuated explosion is heard. Sound reported screws slowed gradually and stopped. Intense activity by destroyer screws.
2325 (K) Two (2) depth charges, not close. Went to 200 feet, commenced evasive tactics. Much maneuvering by the destroyers, but they do not come close.
2345 (K) Lost all contact with screws.
6 January
0015 (K) Had just determined to come to the surface, when we heard two (2) heavy explosions. Immediately thereafter, sound hears screws and two (2) ships commence a supersonic search to the southward of us.
0215 (K) Lost all contact.
0250 (K) Surfaced. Knowing that in the morning the hounds would be out, we cleared the area at high speed to the eastward.
8 January
Left the area along our return line to transmit our 081300.
12 January
On surfacing in heavy seas, sheer pins to bow planes carried away. They were replaced, but on rigging the planes in, sheer pins again carried away. After being renewed the second time, it was discovered port plane was about 10° ahead of starboard. Our bow planes are now practically useless.
13 January
0755 (K) Attack No. 3. Lat. 31-26.0 N., Long. 142-39.0 E. Sighted smoke on the horizon, closing it rapidly on this course, picked up masts and stack. Turned to course 000°(T), converging track about 30°.
0815 (K) Target is making about 4-5 knots. Course 330°(T). Submerged and took course to intercept at 2/3 speed. Weather is much too rough to permit a periscope attack; particularly with the bow planes in present condition. If we attack, it must be by sound.
0943 (K) Sound reports screws, close aboard. Change of bearing indicates he is passing astern of us. Since we had already determined his course and speed, we came to a course for a 90 track.
0948 (K) Fired 2 torpedoes from 100 feet.
0952 (K) Heard one (1) very loud explosion, and forty seconds later another similar explosion. Since we cannot come to periscope depth, we shall never know what these explosions were, although the timer interval seems too long to be our torpedoes.
0953 (K) Sound reports fast screws, in addition to target ship. New contact sounds like a DD. Where did it come from?
1015 (K) Lost all contact. Decided to remain submerged until sunset.
14 January
1910 (M) Sighted white flare astern about 10 miles distant. Unidentified. Position: Lat. 32-42.0 N., Long. 146-30.0 E.
15 January
2315 (M) Made contact on SJ radar at 4350 yards, bearing 035°(T), changed course in direction of bearing to investigate. Nothing found.
2325 (M) Lost contact. Resumed base course. Position: Lat. 32-50.0 N., Long. 154-00.0 E.
19 January
1300 (Y) Sighted Midway planes.
1430 (Y) Entered Midway Lagoon and secured to dock. Took on 16,802 gallons of fuel oil.
20 January
0900 (Y) Departed Midway for Pearl.
21 January
0400 (Y) Sighted friendly tanker under escort on opposite and parallel course. Position: Lat. 25-22 N., Long. 174-07.0 W.
24 January
0630 (W) Sighted escort at assigned rendezvous.
[blank] (W) Moored at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

(2.) Weather

The weather during this patrol was not worthy for the number of days of rough seas and overcast skies experienced. We had approximately forty percent (40%) of days when the seas were so rough that depth control at periscope depth was extremely difficult. The large number of overcast days made position keeping difficult, particularly in view of the strong northeast currents encountered during January.

(3.) Tidal Information

The flood and ebb of the tides effect the currents off the east coast of Kyushu, being northerly during the flood, and southerly during the ebb tide; the southerly current being the stronger of the two.

Drifts as high as three (3) to three and five tenths (3.5) knots were experienced in the Kuroshio during January, in the vicinity of the southeast corner of the operating area.

(4.) Navigational Aids

While engaged in planting mines, a gas buoy, red and white striped, was observed in Lat. 32-49 N., Long. 132-12 E. This is believed to be a marker for mid-channel, for night entrance and exit.

The following lights were observed to be burning with normal characteristics: Okino Shima, Tosaki Hana, and Shimanoura. Toi Misaki light was seen to be burning, but with altered characteristics.

(5.) Description of All Ships Sighted

Contact No. Date Time Type Position Course Speed Remarks
1. 12 Dec. 1010 (K) Carrier 32-04 N.
142-30 E.
140° 14 knots Attack No. 1. Using constant helm method of zig-zag.
2. 12 Dec. 1010 (K) DD Same Same Same Patrolling ahead - to starboard about 1500 yards.
3. 16 Dec. 2120 (K) DD 31-55.0 N.
132-55.0 E.
Patrolling Picked up by SJ radar at 8400 yards.
4. 20 Dec. 2340 (K) DD 31-36.0 N.
132-17.0 E.
Patrolling Probably same ship as contact #3. This seems to be his patrol station.
5. 21 Dec. 2315 (K) Sampan Patrol Boat 31-55.0 N.
133-15.0 E.
Patrolling Exchanged recognition signals.
6. 26 Dec. 0015 (K) Sampan 31-26.0 N.
133-36.0 E.
- -  
7. 26 Dec. 0113 (K) Large ship Cruiser? 31-25.0 N.
133-30.0 E.
320° 25-30 knots Picked up by SJ radar at 14,000 yards.
8. 29 Dec. 0130 (K) 2 Freighters 32-19.0 N.
133-20.0 E.
045° 15 knots Picked up by SJ radar at 15,000 yards.
9. 29 Dec. 1330 (K) 2 Sampans 32-13.0 N.
133-01.0 E.
160° 5 knots Patrolling.
10. 31 Dec. 0715 (K) DD Kamikaze Class 31-55.0 N.
132-40.0 E.
270° 15 knots  
11. 31 Dec. 2245 (K) Patrol Boat 31-53.0 N.
132-10.0 E.
150° 13 knots  
12. 1 Jan. 0100 (K) Patrol Boat 32-04.0 N.
132-10.0 E.
180° 10 knots  
13. 2 Jan. 2000 (K) 2 Patrol Boats 31-38.0 N.
131-47.0 E.
180° ? Picked up by SJ radar while submerged just prior to surfacing.
14. 5 Jan. 1100 (K) AK 2000 ton 32-08.0 N.
131-49.0 E.
350° 8 knots Went in to Hososhima.
15. 5 Jan. 2245 (K) Tanker ? and 2 DD 32-09.0 N.
132-10.0 E.
160° 11 knots Attack No. 2. Identity of large ship not certain.
16. 13 Jan. 0755 (K) AK 4000 ton 31-26.0 N.
142-39.0 E.
330° 4.5 knots Attack No. 3. A second ship was heard in vicinity after the attack.

(6.) Description of All Planes Sighted

Contact No. Date Time Type Position Course Altitude Remarks
1. 12 Dec. 0910 (K) - 32-04.0 N.
142-40.0 E.
- - Not sighted. SD radar contact.
2. 12 Dec. 1540 (K) - 32-04.0 N.
142-30.0 E.
- - Not sighted. SD radar contact.
3. 29 Dec. 1320 (K) Land plane Bomber 32-25.0 N.
133-00.0 E.
180° 1000 ft. Sighted through periscope.
4. 6 Jan. 0830 (K) Land plane Bomber 32-07.0 N.
133-00.0 E.
180° 1000 ft. Sighted through periscope.

(7.) Particulars of Attack

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Int. Gyro Angle Track Angle Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Torpedo Performance
1 4 7 secs. 2°L
1200 yds.
1200 yds.
1250 yds.
1300 yds.
MOT 15 ft. 10 ft. Hit

REMARKS: This approach and attack was beautifully simple, and was reminiscent of the peace time practice runs of the simplest kind. The target was picked up at 16,000 yards, her course and speed were determined, and the boat placed on a course for a 100° track, from which we did not deviate thereafter. Although it was expected that the attack would have to be made through a barrage of depth charges, we were not picked up by the destroyer, who crossed our bow blissfully unaware of our presence. Since our fire control data was good and our position was excellent, it is difficult to understand why we hit only with two (2) torpedoes. We believe that our first two torpedoes hit, as this checks with our data. The first hit is believed to have detonated by contact, as it exploded with a sharp crack. The second exploded by influence, as it had the muffled and reverberating sound characteristic of such explosions. The first torpedo hit directly under the break in the flight deck, and the second about 150 feet abaft the first.

This carrier checked very closely with pictures and descriptions we possess of the "Ryujo" although to the Commanding Officer, she looked much larger than 8000 tons. Her flight deck was completely covered with planes, which are believed to have been the "Aichi" "99N" dive bombers. The planes were olive drab color, with a yellow stripe around the after part of the fuselage and a yellow or orange disk forward of the stripe.

The destroyer was of the "Asashio" type and had red and white bands around her stack. She patrolled ahead about 1000 to 1500 yards, and employed no supersonic echo ranging. The course was 140°(T), speed 14 knots.

The carrier was using the constant helm method of zig-zagging. The screw counts were: carrier - 170 R.P.M.; destroyer - 150 R.P.M.

After the torpedoes hit, the carrier screws stopped and were not heard again. Sound reported the usual crackling noises of a torpedoed ship for an hour afterward.

It is unfortunate that we were forced down after we surfaced, and were unable to investigate thoroughly the large gasoline slick, as it may have revealed something interesting.

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Int. Gyro Angle Track Angle Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Torpedo Performance
2 3 7 secs. 14°R
2050 yds.
2000 yds.
1950 yds.
MOT 25 ft. 6 ft. Miss

REMARKS: This attack was the first one made by this Commanding Officer, using data furnished entirely by the SJ radar. At no time was the target itself sufficiently clear to permit obtaining accurate bearings or estimates of her course by eye. The destroyer, however, passed close aboard and was plainly visible. Why he did not see us as well is uncomprehensible, except that we had the advantage of the background. Radar definitely reported three (3) targets, one at a greater and one at a lesser range than the large ship. This therefore, was a valuable ship, but its identity cannot be definitely established. The Commanding Officer saw (and this was corroborated by two lookouts and the O.O.D.) a long low shape with a low superstructure jutting up amidships. With this description it would appear that the ship was a large tanker. It is certain that we hit him with one torpedo and possibly with two. The Commanding Officer cannot vouch for the explosion reported by the torpedo room, as it was not heard by the control party. However, at this point the conning tower was not completely submerged and this may be the explanation. Our fire control data was considered good, as we had the target on the plot over a considerable length of time, and were able to check and recheck his course and speed at 160°(T), 11 knots.

After the first two depth charges were dropped, apparently indiscriminately, the whole target group changed bearing to the westward, and it was ten (10) minutes before any determined search was made by the destroyers. It is believed that the target was heading either for Ariake Wan, or for the nearest beach, although her screws were not heard again after the torpedo explosion.

It is believed that we completely fooled the escorts by taking a northerly course to retire. Or it may be that they believed the attack to have been made from the port side. At any rate, all their efforts to find us were concentrated to the southward, and thereby enabled us to surface during the night and clear the area, which undoubtedly got a good going over in the morning.

Attack No. No. Torp. Firing Int. Gyro Angle Track Angle Est. Range Pt. of Aim Draft of Target Set Depth Torpedo Performance
3 2 8 secs. 8°L
1070 yds.
1070 yds.
MOT 15 ft. 6 ft. Miss - sound shot

REMARKS: It is possible that this ship was the same or one similar to the Q-ship encountered by the TRIGGER in this same vicinity. She was about 5000 tons, MFM composite superstructure, similar to Palao Maru. The explosions heard may have been depth charges dropped by this ship or by the other vessel whose screws were heard after the explosions.

This approach was conducted entirely by sound, as our bow planes were practically useless, and with the heavy seas running, broaching at periscope depth was certain. The Commanding Officer knew the chances of hitting were very small under the above conditions, but since the TDC set-up checked very well with the sound bearings, he could not resist the temptation to fire anyway, and trust to luck.

(8.) Enemy A/S Measures

This area is very well patrolled, particularly the line approximating course 160°(T) from the entrance to Bungo Suido. It should be noted that all patrols were sighted at night. Only two (2) sampans were seen during daylight. No patrols were encountered close to the coast. It is evident that the patrols are concentrating at the intersection on the aforesaid 160° course line, with the steamer lane from Van Diemen straits to the northeastward to Muroto Saki and Shiono Misaki. Patrolling is done by old destroyers and craft which resemble submarine chasers. It is believed that these boats return to their anchorages at daylight.

(9.) Major Defects Experienced

"A" Engineering

(a) December 11, 1942 - Main Control Panel in Maneuvering Room (See BuEng Dwg. No. SS228-862-1379 Alt. 1). A hinge pin in the operating lever linkage for contacts, piece 4 came partially out due to its set screw being broken. This jammed the linkage, making it impossible to put the port motor starting lever into series position (to close piece 4). This put the port motors out of commission for about 20 minutes, while the trouble was located and the pin and set screw replaced.

The trouble was first thought to be caused by the "75% field" interlock not operating, and the interlock solenoid was removed for inspection. It was put back in slight misalignment causing another casualty on December 12.

(b) December 12, 1942 - Main Control Panel in Maneuvering Room (See Contractors Dwg. No. 32-J-441). Due to having been improperly aligned when replaced on December 111, the plunger core (piece 33) jammed in its recess in the port motor starter slide (piece 2), making it impossible to move the port starter lever. The interlock was removed, thoroughly tested and found to be in good condition. It was then replaced and carefully aligned. No further trouble has been experienced.

(c) December 16, 1942 - Lost main power, due to tripping out of battery tank contactors (Contractors Dwg. No. 11-A-4481-1). While making a quick dive, in shifting propulsion from engines to battery, the battery tank contactors tripped out. (The positive side contactor in the forward battery well and both positive and negative contactors in the after battery well). Contactors were reset by hand. Subsequent investigation showed that the contactors were set to trip at 14 Kiloamps, which is the minimum setting. Settings of all contactors were increased to 19 Kiloamps.

(d) All main engine outboard exhaust valves leaked. No's. 2 and 3 leaked most frequently. No leaks encountered unless making a quick dive with main engines on propulsion immediately prior to the dive. Cause thought possibly to be due to back pressure in exhaust header, preventing the valve from making a good seat, or to contraction of the valve disc when cooled, after sealing.

(e) The port reduction gear lube oil sump tank leaked, allowing salt water to get into the reduction gear lube oil. An unsuccessful attempt to find and stop the leak was made during the last refit. More effective measures should be taken during this overhaul.

(f) SJ radar. Shortly after leaving Pearl Harbor, resistor R-104 in the oscillator converter unit burned out, causing resistors R-51.1 and R-51.2 to burn out in the transmitter receiver unit. This defect was corrected by Submarine Force, Midway.

The training motor proved too small to carry the load and heated excessively. It was used only sparingly in order to prevent a total casualty.

The training shafts and gears were not properly aligned during installation. As a result, the entire unit was hard to operate, and was very noisy. Misalignment may have been partly responsible for excessive heating of the motor.

"B" Hull

(a) The attack periscope fogged intermittently during the latter part of the patrol.

(b) The trim pump was, as usual, noisy. Early correction of this defect is strongly recommended.

(c) The sheer pins in the bow plane shafting sheered when the planes were nearly in the rigged-in position, during surfacing in a heavy sea. These pins were replaced and the planes rigged in. Again the pins sheered, and again they were replaced. Upon examination of the rigging system, it was discovered that the port sector gear was meshed with the starboard sector gear, four (4) teeth in advance of its normal position; and that the rigging out stop in the port sector gear was carried away. This resulted in the port plane returning to its normal rigged-in position, while the starboard plane was still slightly rigged-out.

On subsequent dives, the planes were rigged out by hand, care being taken not to go to the full rigged-out position; thus preventing the sector gears from again unmeshing. The planes tilted satisfactorily in this uneven position, however, as an added precaution, no more than ten (10) degrees tilt was put on them.

(10.) Radio Reception

Radio reception was complete.

Last consecutive serial number sent - 170900.

Last consecutive serial number received - 240725.

Much difficulty was experienced in transmitting to NPM.

Radar: The SJ radar performed very efficiently. The Commanding Officer cannot praise this equipment too highly. It proved itself invaluable on many occasions. It is regretted that more opportunities to use it for attack were not presented.

Our experience with the SJ radar equipment has shown that the following results may be expected: (a) Large ships will be picked up at 14,000 - 15,000 yards; also any ship picked up at this range is at once identified as a large ship. (b) Destroyers will be picked up at from 8,000 to 10,000 yards. (c) Large sized sampans and patrol boats will be picked up at 5,000 - 7,000 yards. (d) Wooden sampans will not be picked up, or may give a ragged pip at ranges under 4,000 yards.

Our radar operators became proficient in recognizing the character of pips, and were correct in their judgement on every occasion. On the night of 5 January, the large vessel was picked up first and at a shorter range the operator readily recognized first one and then a second destroyer escort; one at a lesser and one at a greater range than the target ship. Without this information the Commanding Officer would have been unable to form a correct estimate of the situation.

The radar proved itself invaluable defensively also, as it prevented us from running up on a patrolling destroyer on several occasions.

The performance of the SD radar was excellent.

ARC-1. This device was used frequently, but no indications of Japanese radar were noted.

(11.) Sound Conditions and Density Layers

Sound conditions were poor to fair, best ranges being about 3000 yards. No density layers were observed.

(12.) Health and Habitability

Health and habitability were excellent. Normal meal hours were observed. The food on this patrol was exceptionally good. Morale of the crew is excellent.

(13.) Miles steamed enroute to and from station 10620.

(14.) Fuel expended 109,511 gallons.

(15.) Factors of Endurance Remaining

Torpedoes Fuel Provisions (days) Fresh Water Personnel (days)
7 15,614 gallons 7 30 Days (est.) None

(16.) This patrol was ended by provisions of the operation order.

(17.) Remarks - miscellaneous

The officers and men of this ship conducted themselves in accordance with the highest traditions of the Navy during this patrol. Their tireless efforts and attention to duty were remarkable under all conditions.

This patrol was disappointing in the small number of contacts in the area. More time was spent out of the area than was the intention of the Commanding Officer for two (2) reasons: (1) Transmission of three (3) messages, two (2) of which were to clear up communication difficulties caused by our inability to decode a badly garbled message. (2) Navigational difficulties caused by an unexpected easterly set of 3.5-4 knots, coupled with long periods of overcast skies, during which no star sights could be obtained.

It was unfortunate that the situation was such that the Commanding Officer was unable to finish off the carrier The stern tubes should have been fired, even though the data on the TDC was not very accurate.

In the night attack on the vessel tentatively identified as a tanker, six torpedoes should have been fired, as it evidentally was a valuable target to have such a heavy escort. Visibility was such that the target could not be positively identified.

The material condition of this boat is fair to good, but is showing signs of deterioration, through two major and several minor casualties. A thorough Navy yard overhaul is recommended to return her to first class fighting trim. There are two inherent weaknesses that are a continual source of trouble, particularly when attempting to evade: (1) The terrific din set up by the trim and drain pumps; (2) Leaky exhaust valves which makes pumping necessary.

In the past year this vessel has completed four (4) war patrols, plus the long trip from the East Coast. There are on board, several officers and men who have been with the ship since commissioning, and are anxious to remain on board. If this vessel is given an overhaul after this patrol, it is recommended that these men, plus any other deserving cases, be sent back to the States on leave. This will help to maintain the high state of the morale now existent on this vessel.

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